Reconsiderations of an earlier post

Since writing my article defending the stance of Fr. Feeney, various data have forced me to retract and modify the justifications for those conclusions, almost entirely focusing on the necessity of the Sacrament of Baptism to effect membership into the Church. Now, I still accept the conclusions, but for different reasons.

 

Allow me to elaborate.

 

I remarked in that first essay that Canon IV of the 7^th Session of the Council of Trent didn’t make it clear whether or not desiring a sacrament (as opposed to receiving it) sufficed to confer justification for all of the sacraments or some sacraments but not others. And in light of that fact, since it was acknowledged in the same canon that the reception of the sacraments was necessary for salvation, it followed that one needed to receive – and not just desire – at least some of the sacraments. However, new data has caused me to reevaluate that position.

 

A point that some believe refutes the absolute necessity of baptism for salvation is how the canon reads: “If any one saith…that, without [the sacraments], or without the desire thereof, men obtain of God, through faith alone, the grace of justification…let him be anathema.” This is understood by many to mean that sacraments or the desire thereof are two methods that bring justification. However, a contextual analysis will cast doubt on that notion. The phrase ‘and that, without them, or without the desire thereof’ is a translation of the original Latin: et sine eis aut eorum voto. ‘Sine’ is indeed correctly translated as ‘without’, but the ‘without’ meant by ‘sine’ means ‘lack’ or ‘lacking’ (http://www.latin-dictionary.org/sine). There are several ways among others that the term ‘without’ can mean. For instance:

 

1) ‘The people in the house felt a wind that came from without.’ This way of using ‘without’ bespeaks spatial relations. The wind did not originate within the house, so it came from outside, or without.

 

2) ‘You can’t get to London from New York without traveling by plane or by boat.’ This way of using ‘without’ bespeaks method. Since one can’t get to London except by using one of these two methods, one says that ‘without a plane or a boat’ one can’t get to London. A better way of articulating this meaning would be ‘You can’t get to London from New York except by plane or boat.’ Here, ‘without’ refers to a limitation of methods for achieving an end. One must use one or the other, but both are not needed.

 

3) ‘You can’t have a wedding without a bride or a groom’. Another way of articulating this phrase is: Lacking a bride or a groom, you can’t have a wedding. This way of using ‘without’ refers to the conditions for achieving something. Here, it is said that if one lacks either a bride or a groom, you can’t have a wedding. This is quite unlike the aforementioned use of ‘without’, which allows for multiple, though limited, methods of achieving an end. It is perfectly sensible to say that one can get to London from New York with either a plane or a boat, but not both or by any other method. It would be foolish to say that one can have a wedding without a bride or a groom, that is, with only the bride, but no groom, or vice versa. If both conditions are not met then one cannot have a wedding.

 

I assert that the term ‘without’ (sine) used in that canon from Trent provides the 3^rd meaning explained above. As we can see through the definition of the word ‘sine’ and the syntax of the sentence stating the doctrine, the relevant part of the phrase reads: without [that is, lacking] x or without [that is, lacking] y. I assert that a more accurate reading of the text explains that, lacking the one condition (the sacrament itself) or lacking the other condition (the desire for the sacrament), justification will not take place.

 

Some might suggest that this is sophistic word-twisting to accommodate my predilection. A few months ago, I wouldn’t have disagreed. But a further investigation of authoritative documents will dispel that doubt. Firstly, the Catechism of the Council of Trent, commissioned by the Council of Trent itself, explains that the fruits of the Passion of Christ, notably justification, are applied though reception of the sacraments:

 

A third reason [why the sacraments were instituted] is that the Sacraments, to use the words of St. Ambrose, may be at hand, as the remedies and medicines of the Samaritan in the Gospel, to preserve or recover the health of the soul. For, through the Sacraments, as through a channel, must flow into the soul the efficacy of the Passion of Christ, that is, the grace which He merited for us on the altar of the cross, and without which we cannot hope for salvation. Hence, our most merciful Lord has bequeathed to His Church, Sacraments stamped with the sanction of His word and promise, through which, provided we make pious and devout use of these remedies, we firmly believe that the fruit of His Passion is really communicated to us. (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/romancat.html)

 

That same Catechism further states that:

 

…sins can be forgiven only through the Sacraments, when duly administered…Hence it follows that in the forgiveness of sins both priests and Sacraments are, so to speak, the instruments which Christ our Lord, the author and giver of salvation, makes use of, to accomplish in us the pardon of sin and the grace of justification. (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/romancat.html)

 

Moreover, as the 7^th Session of the Council of Trent begins:

 

 

For the completion of the salutary doctrine on Justification, which was promulgated with the unanimous consent of the Fathers in the last preceding Session, it hath seemed suitable to treat of the most holy Sacraments of the Church, through which all true justice either begins, or being begun is increased, or being lost is repaired. (http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct07.html)

 

Clearly then, the sacraments are needed to live a Christian life since they are how grace and justification are given to us. Relevant to our discussion, we also know from reading the 6^th Session with completeness that desiring Baptism is preparation for receiving justification, while the Sacrament of Baptism itself is the method by which justification takes place:

 

 

 

“CHAPTER IV.

A description is introduced of the Justification of the impious, and of the Manner thereof under the law of grace.

By which words, a description of the Justification of the impious is indicated,-as being a translation, from that state wherein man is born a child of the first Adam, to the state of grace, and of the adoption of the sons of God, through the second Adam, Jesus Christ, our Saviour. And this translation, since the promulgation of the Gospel, cannot be effected, without [sine] the laver of regeneration, or the desire thereof, as it is written; unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God.

 

…

 

CHAPTER VI.

The manner of Preparation.

Now they (adults) are disposed unto the said justice, when, excited and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith by hearing, they are freely moved towards God, believing those things to be true which God has revealed and promised,-and this especially, that God justifies the impious by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; and when, understanding themselves to be sinners, they, by turning themselves, from the fear of divine justice whereby they are profitably agitated, to consider the mercy of God, are raised unto hope, confiding that God will be propitious to them for Christ’s sake; and they begin to love Him as the fountain of all justice; and are therefore moved against sins by a certain hatred and detestation, to wit, by that penitence which must be performed before baptism: lastly, when they purpose to receive baptism, to begin a new life…

 

…

CHAPTER VII.

What the justification of the impious is, and what are the causes thereof.

This disposition, or preparation, is followed by Justification itself, which is not remission of sins merely, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man, through the voluntary reception of the grace, and of the gifts, whereby man of unjust becomes just, and of an enemy a friend, that so he may be an heir according to hope of life everlasting.

Of this Justification the causes are these: the final cause indeed is the glory of God and of Jesus Christ, and life everlasting; while the efficient cause is a merciful God who washes and sanctifies gratuitously, signing, and anointing with the holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance; but the meritorious cause is His most beloved only-begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, when we were enemies, for the exceeding charity wherewith he loved us, merited Justification for us by His most holy Passion on the wood of the cross, and made satisfaction for us unto God the Father; the instrumental cause is the sacrament of baptism…” (http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct06.html)

 

Identifying the Sacrament of Baptism as the instrumental cause of justification is key. What does it mean to say something is an instrumental cause? An instrumental cause is “a cause that does not begin an action but is applied and directed as a help to its efforts and purpose by the principal agent.” (Fr. John Hardon, Modern Catholic Dictionary) To understand this example, imagine a man, a stick, and a book. The man uses the stick to move the book. The man is the principal actor in the sequence, because it is his power that moves the book. The stick is the instrumental cause, because it is through the stick that the man applies his power to move the book. To say, then, that the Sacrament of Baptism is the instrumental cause of justification is to say that God as the principal agent uses the Sacrament of Baptism as His instrument to convey to the recipient His Justice by which a man is rendered just.

 

To summarize, my revisions have expanded my previous argument to mean that justification is not possible without the sacraments, and most especially the Sacrament of Baptism. I originally limited my argument to insist that the Sacraments (particularly Baptism) were needed for just salvation, but not also justification.

 

As a minor point, in the first article I quoted Pius XII to the effect that only those who received Baptism and professed the Catholic Faith were the members of the Catholic Church. I at first figured him to be the only source on the subject, but there are a few more that I have found. Perhaps they are not the only ones, but it’ll do for now. To iterate:

 

For it is through Baptism we are made members of Christ and compacted into the Body of the Church. ~ Pope Eugene IV, Exultate Deo

 

All multitude of the faithful are regenerated from water and the Holy Ghost, and through this truly incorporated into the Church. ~ III Council of Valence

 

Furthermore, St. Augustine says that Cornelius the Centurion, although praised in the Scriptures, was not yet such that he could have been saved unless he became incorporated in the Church through the Sacrament of Baptism. ~ St. Robert Bellarmine, On the Sacrament of Penance

 

Holy baptism holds the first place among all the sacraments, for it is the gate of the spiritual life; through it we become members of Christ and of the body of the church. Since death came into the world through one person, unless we are born again of water and the spirit, we cannot, as Truth says, enter the kingdom of heaven. The matter of this sacrament is true and natural water, either hot or cold. The form is: I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the holy Spirit. ~ Council of Florence

The differences between the conservative and the liberal in today’s world are subtle, but critical. The truth is that neither really believes in democracy. However, each’s disbelief is for different reasons. The conservative disbelieves because there is a real right and wrong with which people must accord. The will of the masses must conform to those principles, not they to it. Nothing can delegitimize the people’s will if it wills accordingly, and vice versa. But it’s right or wrong that has primacy.

The liberal, however, doesn’t believe in a real right or wrong; that’s a projection of each individual man and ergo a projection of each mass of men, which differs from the individual only in quantity. For him, the necessity of adhering to any given will of the people is only a matter of time. At this point in time they desire one thing; in the future, another. The character of each time period’s desires are just as good as any other. So why not stifle and manipulate their will to accord with the desires of the few? He doesn’t have any duty to be good, or inform the masses about right or wrong. He’s out there to do and get whatever he wants. Everybody else can always catch up to his wants. Not that it matters whether or not they do. 

Why? Because YOLO, bee-otch.

Time proceeds from this world, not before the world.

~St. Ambrose, Hexameron 1:37, FC 42:42

“We who are given the fullness of true Christianity are obliged to be working on ourselves, to be watching the signs of the times, and to be extremely joyful, as St. Paul is constantly saying: ‘Rejoice in the Lord always, and again I say: Rejoice!’ (Phil. 4:4). We rejoice because we have something which all the death and corruption of this world cannot take away, that is, the eternal Kingdom of Jesus Christ.”

—Fr. Seraphim Rose

Blog Intro – Read this first!

As you can see, I’m not much for organization. I’ll get to it…eventually.

As a result of years of soul-searching, I believe the time has come for a vigorous reassertion of the perennial and culminating truths of mankind. Religion, society, family, love, metaphysics, you name it. Though the articles in this blog are but a few thimble-loads of thought and exposition, I hope that they will inspire you and lead you onward. In addition to various ‘scholarly’ articles, I will give short posts about popular topics. I will also periodically give advice-posts about what to do to start your own journey towards enlightenment, such as tips on study, prayer life, personal character development, and so on.

May God keep you and guide you. May your mind uncover the truth, and your heart lead you onward.

Oh, and I’m not a certain poster from FishEaters. Though I’m anonymous, I thought I’d get that outta the way.

A Brief Defense of Fr. Leonard Feeney’s Stance on Baptism

There’s more to be said about the late Fr. Leonard Feeney than I could – or intend – to write about here. For those who want the full scoop they can use this site. Briefly, Fr. Feeney was a man who staunchly asserted the doctrine of Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus – the dogma stating that one must necessarily be a professing member of the Catholic Church in order to achieve salvation. As an effort to reinforce this teaching, he preached the absolute necessity of baptism by water, for it is by that sacrament and that sacrament alone that men become members of the Catholic Church. In doing so, he deliberately rejected the baptisms of desire and blood. The former is the idea that one can achieve salvation by having an unfulfilled desire to be baptized (presumably unfulfilled by reason of death) and the latter is the idea that one can achieve salvation by being martyred in the name of God. It is only true baptism – that by water – that brings a man to salvation.

For the edification of man and the glory of God, I venture to show that the dogma of the Church vindicates Fr. Feeney.

One must of necessity be a member of the Catholic Church in order to be saved. As was defined at the 4^th Lateran Council: “The universal Church is one outside of which none is saved.”

How does one enter the Catholic Church? By sacramental baptism, which is the “Sacrament of regeneration by water in the word”, as the Council of Trent tells us. As Pope Pius XII stated in Mystici Corporis: “Only those are to be accounted really members of the Church who have been regenerated in the waters of baptism and profess the true faith.” (emphasis added) As Christ Himself stated: “unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” (emphasis added) As Ludwig Ott stated on pg. 311 of his book Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, the unbaptized are not members of the Church. It is sacramental baptism – that celerated in water – that incorporates into the Church because only sacramental baptism bestows the spiritual character that causes one to be a formal member.

Lest there be any doubt in that short paragraph of the dogmatic truth of what has been said, let’s continue. The Council of Trent defined in its 7^th Session “On the Sacraments in General” that:

“If anyone says that the sacraments of the New Law are not necessary unto salvation, but superfluous; and that, without them, or without the desire thereof, men obtain of God, through faith alone, the grace of justification – though all [the sacraments] are not indeed necessary for every individual; let him be anathema.”

Some have used this definition to show that all that is necessary for the justification given by all the sacraments – and, ex hypothesi, baptism – is to desire the sacrament. But, that is not the case. In the above statement, there are two independent clauses and one dependent clause that goes with the first independent clause presented. I will write them out as such:

1^st independent clause with its associated dependent clause: If anyone says that the sacraments of the New Law are not necessary unto salvation but are superfluous…though all are not indeed necessary…let him be anathema.

In the dependent clause, the Church is affirming that one need not receive all of the sacraments to achieve salvation. Yet, in the independent clause it attaches to, it affirms that it cannot – on pain of heresy – be said that none are necessary. If not all are necessary but not none are necessary, then some are necessary. This means that at least one is necessary, for in formal logic the term ‘some’ means ‘one or more’.

2^nd independent clause: If anyone says that…without them [the sacraments], or without the desire thereof, men obtain of God, through faith alone, the grace of justification…let him be anathema.

The phrase ‘without them’ stands in contrast to desiring them, illustrating that the former term speaks of receiving and experiencing the sacraments. However, it must be remembered that this definition is given when speaking of the sacraments generally, not each particular sacrament. Based upon this statement alone, it is not clear that desire for a given sacrament suffices to receive justification for some but not all sacraments, for all sacraments, or for none. However, given the 1^st independent clause and its attendant dependent clause, one must conclude that to achieve salvation one must receive – not simply desire – at least one sacrament.

Continuing with the 7^th Session and when speaking “On Baptism”, the Catholic Church declared in Canon 5 that: “If anyone says that baptism is…not necessary for salvation, let him be anathema.” Put simply, one must receive Baptism in order to go to heaven.

Now, what is justification? As Fr. John Hardon’s Modern Catholic Dictionary tells us, the Council of Trent stated that: “Justification is the change from the condition in which a person is born as a child of the first Adam into a state of grace and adoption among the children of God through the Second Adam, Jesus Christ our Savior.”

The Council of Trent further explains what justification is. The final cause, or the goal, of justification is the glory of God; the efficient cause – what brings justification into existence – is God in His mercy. The meritorious cause – that by which something is merited or granted to a certain being or beings – is Jesus Christ in His sacrifice on Calvary. The formal cause – the identity of justification – is the justice of God by which we are made just. The instrumental cause, the Council tells us, “is the sacrament of baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, without which (faith) no man was ever justified.”

This passage is key. An instrumental cause, according to Hardon, is “a cause that does not begin an action but is applied and directed as a help to its efforts and purpose by the principal agent.” To understand this example, imagine a man, a stick, and a book. The man uses the stick to move the book. The man is the principal actor in the sequence, because it is his power that moves the book. The stick is the instrumental cause, because it is through the stick that the man applies his power to move the book. Now, the sacrament of baptism is obviously the instrumental cause by which God’s justice, the principle agent, is applied to man. Baptism is identified as the ‘sacrament of faith’. There are two ways to understand this concept: that faith is a sacrament, or that baptism is the sacrament belonging to faith, or rather faith’s sacrament. The latter isn’t true, for faith isn’t a sacrament. The latter must be the right interpretation. Now, a man does indeed need faith as a pre-condition to receiving justification, but it is by the sacrament of Baptism that God applies justification to man. Not in the least of these graces is incorporation into the Catholic Church, membership in which is necessary for salvation.

Let it be said that the transition spoken of in the above definition of justification happens only once. That is not to say that one can have only one justification; one can have several, if one falls many times away from God. However, the transition of being in the state of the children of Adam – that of Original Sin and so forth – to being adopted by God occurs only once. Once that state is wiped away it cannot be returned to, though one may return to the state of sin. Yet, as Trent’s elaboration upon the causes of justification reveals, the first justification – the one where man goes from being in the state of Adam to adoption by God – must be effected by reception of Baptism, faith being a pre-condition to Baptism and, ultimately, the justification it brings. Without Baptism one cannot escape the destiny towards Hell according to the inheritance of the children of Adam. One still can merit damnation to Hell after having received Baptism, but one cannot escape it without Baptism.

What is salvation? As that same book by Fr. Hardon tells us, salvation is “the deliverance from straitened circumstances or oppression by some evil to a state of freedom and security. As sin is the greatest evil, salvation is mainly liberation from sin and its consequences. This can be deliverance by way of preservation, or by offering the means for being delivered, or by removing the oppressive evil or difficulty, or by rewarding the effort spent in co-operating with grace in order to be delivered.”

In this life, we can be justified, but we are not secure, for we are still susceptible to the loss of justification through sin. However, salvation is when sin is no longer able to ruin us in our justified states, and we belong eternally to God. That “freedom and security” belonging to salvation comes when we’ve completed our lives in a state of grace, essential to which is reception of the sacrament of Baptism.

As Canon 2 of the same session and topic declares: “If anyone says that true and natural water is not of necessity for baptism…let him be anathema.” For Baptism to be what it is, water must be used. Desire, martyrdom, milk, ginger ale, drinkable yogurt, or anything else will not suffice.

To achieve membership in the Catholic Church, one must be baptized. To be baptized, one must have received a baptism celebrated in water. Anything else is not Baptism. Anything else will not bring salvation.

With charity towards all, enmity towards none and a desire that in all things God may be glorified, I submit this brief summary for the edification of all its readers.

Sex & Its Perversions

[Note: I will again not cite sources, for I didn’t explicitly consult when writing this. However, some of the topics for which I did cite (or previously adduced sources) are discussed here. You may consult those materials. To explain the metaphysics of the family, I was inspired by a chapter in Right & Reason by Fr. Austin Fagothey, titled “The Family”. I was also inspired by an article by John Finnis used in the reader Why Humanae Vitae Was Right, edited by Janet Smith. Unfortunately, the article’s title escapes me.]

 

 

To understand how a being is good one must understand what it means for it to be. Better stated, one must understand the kind of being that a given being is. Take, for example, a watch. A watch is a time-telling being; in the nature of being a watch is the disposition to yield time-telling behavior. If the watch tells time well, it is a good watch because it is fulfilling the identity of a watch. If it is broken, it is a bad watch because it is not fulfilling the identity of a watch – to tell time.

 

Likewise, if a man wants to be good he must fulfill the identity of his being, which is humanity. He must behave consistently with the characteristics that make a human, human. For an example that we shall return to, one aspect of his being is to understand truth. By evaluating the nature of his mind and reasoning powers, one is lead to conclude that he has such a characteristic in his being. Since to be good is to fulfill one’s being, and part of his being is to be a reasoner, and to reason is to discern truth, part of his good is achieved by discerning truth.

 

Now, part of man’s identity is sexuality. It’s clear from the evaluation of sexuality that it is characterized by the disposition to reproduce. Connected with this are 2 aspects: parental relationships and relationships with one’s sexual compliment – for a male, a female, and vice versa. The former consists in authority over a child so the parents may cultivate in that child the characteristics that make one human. That is essentially what is meant by reproduction: making a new person. This consists in ‘growing’ all those traits by which a human is what it is – bodily and ‘soulfully’, if you will. The latter might be called ‘spousal love’. To fulfill the reproductive nature of sexuality each sex needs to be receptive to the participation of the other sex. In virtue of the human form, all humans receive the characteristics of their being (and ergo that by which they are good) by the reproductive unity of the sexes. For a particular person, whilst embracing his or her sexuality, to be good, (s)he must realize that this reproductive end of sexuality can only be met by accepting one’s sexual compliment, as regards his or her whole person, as a necessary participant in that venture. For it is, in part, by the identity and characteristics of the other that the child receives its being and goodness. These characteristics aren’t simply genes (the bodily) but also the personality, the moral character and so forth (hence the term ‘soulful’).

 

Whole books could be and are dedicated to explaining what I just wrote in about in a simple paragraph, but let it suffice. (I will perhaps write a short discourse on the metaphysics of the family, but that’s forthcoming.) For the questions that concern us are these: What does it mean to be ‘perverse’? How can sexuality be perverted?

The root of the word ‘perverse’ provides a clue. It stems from the Latin ‘perversus’, which means ‘turned around’. Now, among other things, moral goodness consists in the will selecting and intending good behavior. A behavior is thus morally perverse when an agent deliberately wills a behavior to obtain an end that is not consistent with the goods of the human identity that the behavior is to fulfill. The will ‘turns around’ from good ends and uses behaviors that are disposed to those ends to achieve contrary ends. Getting back to our first example, one aspect of man’s being, and ergo an aspect by which he is good, is to discern and pursue truth. Now, the mind is the ‘tool’ of reason by which he reaches that end. Now, sometimes (perhaps always for some people) associated with the attainment of truth is a ‘eureka moment’. By that I mean the moment of elation one gets when one learns some fact. Suppose a man were to use his reason, not with the intention of learning truth, but with the intention of gaining the ‘eureka moment’. It is not the truth as such that he wants, but the sentiment associated with it. Now, the good of being a reasoner is to discern truth, not gain the ‘eureka moment’. If he does so, he is rejecting the good of understanding truth – the good proper to the fulfillment of his mind and being a reasoner – and choosing as his end something that does not fulfill the good of being a reasoner. While the truth may in a circumstance be that which gives the ‘eureka moment’, his interest is the elation and not the truth as such. To be good is to want to gain the truth, not to simply attain it by accident of pursuit of elation. It is in this that the action is perverse: willing a behavior in order to achieve an end that is inconsistent with the good that derives from the nature of that behavior.

 

So, a man is sexually perverse when he wills sexual behavior for an end that is inconsistent with the goods of sexual behavior: parental relationship and spousal love. While there are many, let’s look at three sexual perversions that sadly are applauded today:

1) Masturbation

 

In this behavior, both the end of parenthood and the relationship with one’s sexual compliment are ignored so as to achieve sense experience. Moreover, as regards the relation with one’s sexual compliment, a person is imagined, rather than veridically interacting with, in the context of an erotic moment so as to derive the sensations one would achieve if the act were performed veridically. This behavior shows a lack of integrity, for by performing this act one’s interest is only the sense experience of sexuality rather than the goods proper to it.

 

2) Contraceptive Behavior

 

With this act, the relationship with one’s sexual compliment is had, but the relationship is not in such a way that is consistent with the nature of sexuality. The end to which the sexual act is directed is the sensation that one achieves through sexual contact with another’s body. Now, it is partially through the being and character of the sexual compliment (partially the self) that one achieves the end of reproduction, which is the cultivation of a new person. Thus, one of the goods of sexuality is receptivity to the identity of one’s sexual compliment. This receptivity entails acceptance of the participation of the other’s person in providing for the identity and flourishing of a new being. So, the perversion of contraceptive behavior is an embrace of a sexual behavior that rejects the spousal unions towards which sexuality leads its participants by its very nature.

 

3) Homosexuality

 

The same points as discussed above apply also to homosexuality with respect to the embrace of sexual behavior for the purposes of achieving sensuality rather than the goods of sexuality. However, the added error is the refusal to interact with the complimentary sex whereby the goods of sexuality are fulfilled. The nature of sexual behavior disposes humans to a relationship with their sexual compliments and receptivity to their identities and characters. Bear in mind that I’m using ‘reproduction’ in the sense I spoke of in paragraph three – the cultivation of new humans as regards their total being. Humans receive and actualize their beings through the qualities that each sex individually passes on, as well as by bearing witness to the unique relationship that characterizes the cooperative unity of the sexes, actualized in parenthood, towards which all people through sexuality are disposed. It is thus a good of sexuality to be in partnership with one’s sexual compliment. Homosexuality betrays this good by A) being a rejection of sexual interaction with a given individual’s sexual compliment and B) being an entailment of sexual interaction with a member of the same sex for purposes of achieving sensuality, as opposed to the purposes of parenthood.

The Harm Principle

Note: I also will not cite for this paper. I didn’t explicitly consult for this essay, but my ideas draw from the following: After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre; The Federalist Papers; a lecture titled “A Catholic Critique of the American Founding” by Jeffrey Bond (available here)

 

There are some who hold this principle (known as the ‘harm principle’): one can believe as one wishes, but that one can’t force (that is to say, demand) that one accept a certain belief. They say that all moral truth is a matter of what one is disposed to believe (be it by emotion, passion, so on). It is a foundational belief for conceivably billions of people. You’d be hard-pressed to find somebody who won’t cheerfully and effortlessly confess to believing it. It’s quite possibly the cornerstone belief of the modern West. It was a foundational tenet of the French Revolution, articulated in Article IV of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. It is assumed implicitly and without argument in Federalist Paper No. 10, written by James Madison, which among other such documents was used to justify a revised federal government in the United States. Insufficiently brief this historical summary may be, it does suffice to show that the harm principle is a foundational idea in the modern world.

 

But, is the harm principle right? Should we believe it? What characterizes a society that believes the harm principle?

 

To restate, the harm principle is the belief that: one can believe as one wishes, but that one can’t force (that is to say, demand) that one accept a certain belief. Moral truth is a matter of what one is disposed to believe (be it by emotion, passion, or what have you).

 

However, suppose in that moral system that one accepts, there is a belief that one ought to demand others to accept a certain belief. One thus believes as one wishes; that is, one is believing (as one wishes) that it is right to demand that others believe this thing. Those adhering to the given principle in the first paragraph, upon learning this, say that it is not right to force this belief upon others. That is to say, they believe that one ought not believe that one can demand that others believe something. They will then continue that one should be allowed to adhere to the beliefs that one wants to adhere to, since want is the basis of discerning right from wrong.

 

However, the person asserting the harm principle is committed to the idea that the truth of some moral proposition comes from one’s disposition to believe it. Now, is the harm principle ALSO true only as a matter of preference?

 

If it is, one should only accept it if disposed to believe it. By consistency with the details of the harm principle, one may believe the opposite and nobody is allowed to rebuke them, since moral precepts – the harm principle included – are only a matter of preference and these people prefer to demand that others believe certain things.

 

However, if the moral truth of the harm principle ISN’T a matter of preference, then there is at least one moral belief that one is obliged to accept – independent of what one’s preferences are. As such, it is not true that morality is a matter of preference or that one may believe as one wishes. It is instead true that there are moral principles that, because of their truthfulness, one is obliged to accept. Following from this, it is also true that one may demand that others accept a certain belief.

 

Finally, the belief of which one may demand acceptance can’t be the harm principle. On it’s own terms it precludes notion that one may demand others to accept a certain belief as well as the notion that there are moral truths independent of desire that one must accept. Given our analysis of the harm principle applied, this cannot be the case. In short, the harm principle is self-defeating.

 

Are there any dangers are harms that stem from acceptance of the harm principle? I believe there are. Among them is that it causes the inability to justify any moral stances. Judgments of moral value are what give impetus to the selection of various acts and modes of living. Attitudes and beliefs and what it means to have a fulfilling life give rise to these judgments, which in turn affect one’s choice of actions. On the harm principle, those attitudes are based upon want alone, rather than reasons for the choice-worthiness of those attitudes.

If one accepts this principle, problems in justification arise to the self and to others.  With respect to the self, the following must be noted. There is nothing intrinsically, inherently compelling about the will or desire for moral judgment. It is essentially the one arm of the Euthyphro dilemma applied to man: are things good because a man wills it so? If the will were taken as such, any other moral perspective would be just as compelling if only somebody willed it. There is thus no reason to insist on any particular perspective on the moral life and subsequently dedicate oneself to it. So why believe one over the other? Why believe anything at all?

In terms of justification to others, the following is also disturbing. Upon adhering to the harm principle, the moral systems that various people subscribe to aren’t grounded in or deduced from any truth about what is fulfilling, true and good for the human identity. They are chosen based upon will and preference. When moral systems and the actions of those embracing them conflict, no appeals to the reasonability of one over the other can be made since the systems are chosen by preference and desire. If no reasons can in principle be found for taking one over the other, the notion that one must debate rationally about ethics becomes untenable.

 

How, then, can one resolve conflict differences? One can try to create a system where all can act according to their moral systems without impacting or limit anybody else’s. However, what it means to hurt, or rather limit, expression of one’s or another’s value system will be relative to each value system’s stance on right, wrong, help and hurt. There are, according to the harm principle, no reasonable goods to base this system upon (except by collusion of like wills). So ideas about the kind of system that enables somebody to satisfactorily exercise x value system without inhibition of the self or others will, like all other value judgments made according to the harm principle, be subject to impassable conflicts in value judgment. Moreover, the idea that one ought to have such a system to begin with is itself a subjective moral assertion. If moral values are subjective, what reason is there that one ought to create a system where people do what they want without hurting others? Wouldn’t selecting this view limit the expression of people whose moral values are opposed to such a system? Indeed it would.

 

Moral conflicts furthermore become interminable, ever-present, ever-increasing. In the harm principle system, since there’s no recognizable (or even conceivable) standard to decide moral right and wrong, no perspective can be reasonably called wrong. The indignation at the embrace or exercise of a given belief contrary to one’s own can continue indefinitely. If there’s no reasonable standard to decide which side is a loser, anybody is entitled to feel dispossessed when not getting their way. Since there’s no standard to decide which side is the winner, anybody can claim moral victory or superiority over opponents for any reason.

 

Failing that, one can try to pressure another’s will, preferences and emotions to accord with the perspective one wants him or her to take to enable pursuit of one’s own value system. Rational demonstrability isn’t an option in view of the fact that morality isn’t reasoned about on the harm principle system. Emotivism is the only functional method. This is exactly what one would expect on the subjectivist view of ethics. One doesn’t adhere to a given value system because it’s true, but because one is disposed to accept it. Quite obviously there are people in this world who have different value judgments than we do, and their adherence to and exercise of them more than often prevents the exercise of our own. In a moral worldview where value judgments are made based upon desire and disposition, to get another to facilitate the exercise of one’s moral system, one can’t find ways of showing the truth or reasonability of a given system. One can at best hope to find ways to compel another to end adherence to and/or practice of an opposing system. These compulsions will, of course, be made independently of whether or not they are truthful. Moreover, there’s no reason to operate within any ethical boundaries when having the aforesaid engagements, since such precepts are compelling only by desire. Should one think some method will be most expedient to eliminating opposition, there’s no reason not to use it or feel held up by ethical concerns, since those very judgments about the ethics of debate or methods of attaining one’s desires are themselves true only by preference.

 

Hopefully by now the reader has come to see how quickly ‘do whatever you want, just don’t force your beliefs on others’ devolves into simply ‘do whatever you want’. But let’s continue…

 

What kind of people flourish and are produced in the harm principle system? Exactly the kind of system where all moral truth derives from will and desire: people who are self-aggrandizing and self-interested, hostile to virtue – for our purposes, the habituation to act consistently with moral values that fulfill the human identity. Since all moral choices are expressions of will and desire, the moral choices about how to fulfill one’s moral choices are also chosen by will and desire. Exhortations to virtue and virtuous action are taken to be meaningless by parity of reasoning on a subjective view of ethics. Moreover, one can view them as opportunities for manipulation. By accepting them, one would be acting in a predictable, regularized way. This permits one’s opponents to anticipate one’s behavior and take actions that help them reach their goals more effectively and in a way that would prevent the person manipulated from countering, since that would be beyond the ethical bounds he accepts. Further, the acceptance of the virtues can thus be viewed as an inhibition on the fulfillment of one’s will; one would be committing to ideas that have no truth value, derailing the pursuit of the most efficacious means of achieving one’s desires.

Clarity of Moral Reasoning following the PDBB

(note: I will not source for this article. But for those who are interested, in addition to the sources already cited in earlier essays, my understanding of the doctrine of moral good derives from Aquinas by Edward Feser [specifically the chapter titled “Metaphysics”] and Right & Reason by Fr. Austin Fagothey.)

 

Does the PDBB have any affect upon how we think about moral goodness and moral reasoning? I think that it does. As Aquinas and Aristotle before him taught us, the first and most basic principle of moral reasoning is: Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum[1] – Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. But how is good discerned? A being is said to be good insofar as it fulfills and perfects its being. Take for instance an equilateral triangle. It is the identity of a particular equilateral triangle to exhibit ‘equilateral triangularity’ – a closed polygon with 3 angles, each 60 degrees, adding up to 180 degrees. If this form, or identity, is fulfilled, it is said to be a good triangle. If some attribute of the triangle didn’t approximate to the form of equilateral triangularity (eg. poorly-drawn sides or rounded angles) it is a bad triangle.

 

Evidently, the form of a particular thing plays a part in what it means for a thing to be good. One could say that each particular thing has a ’whatness’, and the fulfillment (or lack thereof) of that ‘whatness’ will decide if that thing is good or bad. Our particular being is an equilateral triangle, that is, a being who’s identity is to be a ‘manifester’ of equilateral trinangularity. If this being, or any other being, fulfills the ‘whatness’ by which it exists and is identified (ie, ‘it is a dog, a human, a photon, etc.’) it is a good being.

 

Moving over to the human inquiry into ethics, we are wont to identify people as good or bad based upon whether or not they fulfill what it means to be human, to manifest humanity. A man who, among other things, is disposed to render to people and institutions their rights (ie. is just), dedicate himself to the welfare of others (ie. is charitable) and so on is considered a good man. If he were to cheat others out of receiving their rights, or be single-mindedly self-aggrandizing, he would be said to be a bad man. We say this because what it means to be human is to be just, charitable, and so on, whereas it is a detraction from meaning of being human to be unjust and self-centered.

 

One can see right away how this analysis overcomes the subjectivism assumed in modern ethics. Arguably the most famous controversy in ethics derives from the is/ought problem of David Hume. Statements of ‘ought’ – those concerning moral obligation for how to act and behave – at best derive from emotive preference of each moral agent. They do not, he claimed, come from objective reality since asking how the world or different beings are doesn’t detail how they ought to be. On the analysis of the PDBB, the irreconcilability of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is false because statements about what or how things are come loaded with value judgments, or statements about how things ought to be. If a thing is good based upon whether or not it manifests its form, its ‘whatness’, the kind of being that it is, statements about reality became precepts for what it takes to be good.

 

As we saw in a previous essay, the Cartesian-scientistic metaphysics subjectivizes the qualitiative, non-quantifiable being and objectivizes the quantitative, non-qualitative being. Not the least important element subjectivized on this doctrine is the forms, which are the foundational tool for assessing goodness. On this worldview, questions concerning a being’s mass or half-life are taken to be truth-contentful. Yet, questions about what is means to be prudent, just, faithful, charitable, and other elements considered key to the human endeavor are considered to be projections of the mind. It is said that there is no standard to appeal to about these notions except the perspective of the perceiver. If these entities, which as we’ve seen are integral to discerning good and evil, derive their existence from subjective perception, then what it is to say something is good or evil is a derivation of one’s perspective. And since, according to this metaphysical view, there is no objective standard than one’s perceptions to refer to about these entities, one perspective on good and evil is no more or less true than any other. What can at most be debated about is not whether or not this or that view on good or evil is the right one – the one that is real – but whether this or that view is the one that an individual perceives. One view, then, is just as true as any other.

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[1] Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 94, a. 2, c.

The PDBB & Modern Science

From our discussion of the PDBB, we turn now to see whether or not it is applicable to the real world. Hopefully that discussion has shown the reader how taking different metaphysical premises can govern one’s interpretation of what is. What divisions of being there are varied tremendously between the PDBB and scientism.  For the PDBB, there’s 2 categories of objective being; for scientism, one. For the PDBB, change in beings is accounted for by alteration of forms; for scientism, the motions amongst matter. Moreover, neither doctrine is some unadulterated scientific fact deriving from some experiment. Instead, each is an interpretation of the experiential world that influences one’s understanding of what exactly it is experienced. Needless to say, scientism is indubitably the reigning metaphysical doctrine of the modern world. Very few truly appreciate this fact, if for no other reason than very few realize how truly scientistic they are in their thinking. I know I didn’t.

As we’ve had occasion to see, the truth or falsity of either doctrine will have a heavy impact on what might be called ‘the human endeavor’. If scientism is true, all that’s real is the material while all of the non-quantitative, qualitative notions that we entertain – the meaning and relevance of God, our humanity, love, friendship, virtue, so on – have no objective identity, but rather receive their meanings by way of subjective perception and understanding. If the PDBB is true, the non-quantitative and qualitative are what’s real, the material deriving realness from it. All those notions just listed and more take on an objective character independent of perception and acquire a non-relative meaning in the lives of all whom they apply to.

Is the PDBB a true description of the nature of being? Or has scientism shown that all that exists is nothing but the material? I will show that the former is true, while the latter is false, and this truth asserts itself amidst discoveries in modern physics. I admit that I am not authoritative in this area; my discoveries will draw upon those of a man who is: Wolfgang Smith. Smith doesn’t need me to introduce him; feel free to read his wikipedia article. But, following his accomplished career as a mathematician and physicist, he has written many books explaining that modern science has been captured by scientistic thinking, showing that scientistic doctrines are not necessary for doing science and, in the final analysis, insufficient for understanding the natural world. His magnum opus – The Quantum Enigma – which this article will summarize, explains that problems understanding the discoveries of quantum physics – the physics studying behaviors in the microscopic and atomic world – are due to false interpretations based upon scientism. With a reintroduction of the potency/act distinction and its attendant hylomorphism the ‘quantum world’ and indeed the rest of reality begin to make sense, and in a way that reveals God and the path to enlightenment to man. To this task we now turn…

Smith’s thesis turns upon defining some key terms, the first of which are his distinctions between the ‘corporeal world’ and the ‘physical world’. “By the corporeal world we shall henceforth understand the sum total of things and events that can be directly perceived by a normal human being through the exercise of his sight, his hearing, and his senses of touch, taste, and smell…”(26) This includes all the noises, colors and so on, but most critically the forms as we’ve come to understand them.  For instance, when one looks at an apple, common sense belief declares that one sees not merely an assemblage of colors and so on, but a being which manifests those phenomena: an apple. To say that there is an apple betrays a definition of ‘apple’ – its form – that applies to particular beings that manifest it. So, forms are part of the corporeal world as Smith understands it. Distinguished from the corporeal world is the ‘physical universe’, which is the realm of quantitative values that are abstracted from and by interaction with the corporeal world.

Unlike the corporeal world, which is experienced through the senses, the physical universe and its entities is understood by use of various tools and instruments. This data is later given perceptible representation by models, graphs, numerical representations, and so forth. For example, one does not perceive the mass of the apple in the way that one sees the apple itself. However, one can learn the mass by use of a scale or other instrument that is competent to determine this datum about the corporeal apple. The point being is that the corporeal world is what is engaged through measurement to render the physical universe and its values. Moreover, the values found in the physical world must have come from a real corporeal object in order to be objectively real. If the corporeal object is an illusion, so are the physical values ‘pulled’ from it. Suppose that the apple you just believed you weighed the mass of was a mirage of sorts. The experience of measuring its mass was thus equally illusionary. What then do you have the mass of? Nothing. Is the value that you have objectively real? No.

Smith explains: “Every corporeal object X can itself be subjected to all kinds of measurements, and determines thus an associated physical object SX.” (34) Our apple can be measured for its radius, mass, and so on; those data can later be given a representation – a graph, a formula, what have you. But let it not be said that they are both perceptible. Only the corporeal object is perceptible; the physical object is given a perceptible representation, but isn’t of itself perceptible. Modern science has established that physical objects are compositions of atoms and subatomic particles, being matter and material per se. Yet this doesn’t make the physical object any more perceptible, for “what we perceive is not a collection of atoms, subatomic particles or Schrödinger waves”, but an apple, a tree, a dog. (35)

However, what is taken to be science tells us that all that exists is nothing but matter, the notions of appleness or treeness or dogness illusory if thought of as more than matter. Recall what René Descartes said:

We can easily conceive how the motion of one body can be caused by that of             another, and diversified in size, figure and situation of its parts, but we are wholly             unable to conceive how these same things (size, figure, motion), can produce             something else of a nature entirely different from themselves, as, for example,             those substantial forms and real qualities which many philosophers suppose to be             in bodies…

Yet those substantial forms and real qualities are those that we engage with to render and measure and study physical objects. If these things are illusory, the physical data that we derive must be equally illusory. The physical world wouldn’t be discernible if there weren’t perceptible things that enable us with our scientific instruments to ‘get at’ the physical world and its data.

But perhaps all ways of being do derive in some way from the physical objects. Perhaps there are some characteristics of the physical world that, when ascertained, do account for all else, including the ‘substantial forms and real qualities’ that Descartes couldn’t wrap his head around. This is the hope of scientism: that all being is nothing but the physical. As our discussion of Smith’s discoveries show, this is not true.

Before getting to the ‘meat’ of the matter, several things need clarification. The corporeal object X is what ‘presents’ to scientists the physical object SX. However, not all SXs have an X. There are two kinds of physical objects – according to Smith’s terminology, ‘subcorporeal’ and ‘transcorporeal.’ The former is ‘below’ the corporeal and refers to it. (39) An example is the mass, weight and dimension of the apple, for the data derived by study of the apple’s physical character refer to the corporeal character of the apple. The latter is not ‘below’ the corporeal but interact with it. Electromagnetic fields and fundamental particles of themselves don’t have a corporeal character, but are known through interactions with the corporeal world. Moreover, the former derive from direct observation and are given in physical data. The latter is entirely inferred, being understood by the physical data alone but given a corporeal presentation – a chart or graph, perhaps (52). One knows the magnetic field of a magnet not by observing the magnetic field as such, but perhaps by placing the magnet under a piece of paper and placing a bunch of iron filings onto the paper that assemble according to the behavior of the field.

‘Specification’ is Smith’s term for the methods by which one ‘specifies’, or assesses, the character of the physical object. (52-53) Smith’s question is that of the scientistic metaphysicians: is it possible to specify the physical object so completely that all past and future observations of the object specified can be predicted? Smith uses the term ‘physical system’ to speak of the mathematical representation of a physical object. ‘Observables’ are quantities associated with the physical system that can in principle be determined empirically. The physical system will determine what can and cannot be specified, that is, what the observables are. (54) If the system charts only for weight, you can specify only weight; if it also charts for mass, dimension and so on, you can specify those things, too. The scientistic question is thus restated: is there a set of observables in a physical system that can in principle determine all other observables? Do facts about the physical world determine all others? As quantum physics tells us, the answer is no.

It is often said that the quantum world is fundamental particles is strange, whereas the ‘macroworld’ of planets and baseballs is not. This strangeness is articulated by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, stating that increasing knowledge of one observable’s value (perhaps position) of a particle means that another observable’s value (say, momentum) can be discerned with decreasing precision.[1] Attendant to this notion are the ideas that the electron is both a particle and a wave, occupies two places, and so on. Yet when studying planets and baseballs this problem isn’t had. However, conceived physically, the macroworld is just the quantum world because, considered in this way, the macroworld is fundamental particles of varying aggregates. However, when we’re dealing with the macroworld, we’re extracting data about the physical world through interaction with the corporeal objects. As we hit the quantum world, we are more aware that we are dealing with the physical world in itself. (57)

It has been said that the quantum world is strange compared to that of common experience. For example, some hold that electrons are both particles and waves, exist in multiple locations, and so on. Smith postulates that the notion of the strangeness of the quantum world is a failure to distinguish between the quantum world itself from its observables – position, momentum, and so on. (58) Physical systems, and by extension the fundamental particles they represent, are described by state vectors. State vectors describe two things:  the average value of an observable of a given physical system over x number of observations, and the standard deviation from that average. (59) Both, evidently, are probabilistic. The quantum world is not itself indeterminate; we know that the fundamental particles are there. But what is observable about them – what the physical systems can tell us – is statistical. As Smith illustrates, one knows that a coin exists without knowing whether one will see heads or tails following the coin-toss.

It is not known prior to measurement of a physical system’s observables what values for that system one will find. It is only when we measure – interacting with the empirical, corporeal world – that we grasp the behavior and observable character of the system. It is in the corporeal world that the physical world becomes understandable, its values being capable of being deduced. It moreover can’t be eliminated as not objective or ‘nothing but’ the physical world. For the physical world of itself doesn’t actually have x or y value, but only possibly, only potentially. (60) Let’s return to the apple example. Scientistic doctrine teaches that the identity of the apple wholly arises from its atomic structure and behavior. However, quantum physics shows that the physical world of itself only potentially exhibits given behaviors; what is observable about it possibly gives x or y value. Yet when one looks at the apple, in its entire corporeal character, one sees a being that is fixed and observable. Here, the physical data can be specified with certainty. Of itself, the physical world has potential identity, but in the corporeal world those values are given realness.

There are two ‘planes’ then, for the natural world: the physical world that has potential values and behaviors, and the corporeal world where those potentials are actualized and known with certainty through engagement with the perceptible objects proper to the corporeal world. As will be made clearer, quantum mechanics suggests potency in the physical world to the actual world that is in the corporeal plane. Now, all observables in a physical system admit a set of possible values. The physical system can be in a state where the value of a given observable is determined with certainty – an ‘eigenstate’. The state vectors represent the states of a physical system; the ‘eigenvector’ is a state vector corresponding to a given eigenstate. Vectors can be added or multiplied to form weighted sums of state vectors, which define other state vectors. It is the weighted sum that corresponds to a physical state. (62-63)

How, then, is the ‘quantum world’ potency? Each eigenvector, of which the state vector is a sum, corresponds to an eigenstate – an empirically realizable, possible value of a physical system. The state vector may be viewed as possible states that physical system can be observed to be in. (64) After measurement of an object, the physical system corresponding to a given object will be known to be in x eigenstate that corresponds to y observable. The state vector has ‘collapsed’, as they say, and the observable of a physical system is known with certainty. Of themselves, physical systems, along with (and perhaps more properly) their observable characteristics, are only potentially in a given state of being. This is what is meant by ‘potency’. The systems have an established value – knowable with certainty – in the corporeal world that presents them. (65) It is this that is meant by ‘act’.

Of the various potencies of the physical systems, one value is determined and made actual. (66) By ‘determined’ I don’t mean something like ‘located’, as one would look at a map to determine, or locate, where Iceland is. I use ‘determined’ to mean ‘established’, as one would determine, or establish, the acreage of a new piece of property. Critically, there is nothing in the state vector itself that explains this determination. For what is shown in the state vector is possible values for a physical system’s observables. Thus, they are incapable of acting until their states of being are determined, or actualized. Nor can another state vector affect the change, for it also stands in need of determination. This is the rub: nothing on the physical plane can cause the determination, or activation, of the state vectors and, ex hypothesi, the physical systems and the fundamental particles they describe. (67-68)

It cannot furthermore be said that if enough fundamental particles, such as atoms, are gathered together (such as in a planet) the potency of the physical world will disappear. Each particle of itself stands in need of determination, regardless of the number considered. Juxtaposing it to a bunch of other particles isn’t going to change its fundamental identity.

What can we conclude from this? When one studies the physical system of a human, a tree, a star or any being, the data collected aren’t the these beings as they are in themselves. Rather, these data are the way that the physical world is actualized with respect to the corporeal object being studied. It cannot be said that the apple is nothing but this physical system. The physical system describes the apple, but isn’t the apple as such. Rather, the apple is the corporeal object under study, its physical character being one of its attributes. It is the corporeal object that is primarily real, not the physical object.

As was explained earlier, for the physical object to be real, the corporeal object from which data about the physical object is gathered must be real. The physical objects of themselves are only potential, yet you, me, the stars, the trees and so on are fixed, determined, and real right now. What is means to be a human, a star or whatever else is thus to be more than physical.

What, then, is the natural world if it is not simply matter? Philosophers through the ages have applied the potency/act distinction to the physical world through the term ‘hylomorphism’. Deriving from Greek, ‘hyle’ means ‘matter’ and ‘morph’ means ‘form’. Matter is the principle that receives form, instantiating it in space and time. Form is the identifiable, knowable character of a particular entity; it is the principle that gives each being its ‘way’ of being. Matter is not real until given form; it is the potential to receive form. Form is that by which beings in the natural world are real. Form, however, doesn’t have existence of itself either. It is not in the meaning of the form ‘humanity’ or any other form to exist, or to be instantiated in x or y individual beings. They are those things by which a being exists; they are its ‘whatness’, essence. Yet the forms make this or that being the type of being that it is only possibly.

What conclusions can be drawn from this study? Deriving from the potency/act distinction, there are two irreducible categories of being: matter and form. Matter does not of itself have being and ergo no intelligibility. Form is the intelligible principle of beings. It is not reducible to the material world, but rather activates the values of the material world. Form is not describable in terms of scientific, quantitative formulae; it has a ‘qualitative’, non-physical identity and character. Form (and its qualitative character) is not relative, but absolute since it is that by which beings exist objectively. A being cannot both be and not be at the same time. Thus, what it means to be human is not relative, but objective. The existence of beings composed of matter and form is not established by either principle. It is not in the identity of either to be, but each potentially exists. Some force must ‘actualize’ the potencies, and ‘formalize’ the matter. In other words, some force must determine, establish, create these beings. This force must be other than a being that potentially exists and, ex hypothesi, other than a material thing. If it were, it of itself would need activation and formalization and thus have no being. It must, then, be that which need not be ‘activated’ or ‘formalized’ in order to be. It must exist by its very nature; it must be Being itself. It is this Being which is meant when Christians speak of God (Exodus 3:14).

As Being itself, God has of Himself the power to effect all ways of being. For, as Being, no particular way of being exists ‘outside of’ God’s being. For created beings – beings which are given being – to be means to be in accordance with the determinations that God has willed to give them. I do not simply mean for them to be x or y kind of being, but exist principally. No matter what kind of being they are, they derive that being from God.

Created beings may act as causes secondarily. For instance, when a man and a woman conceive a child, they act as causes in a sense. But, created beings are not the principle, fundamental cause of being, for the forms themselves by which beings are made real do not come from created beings. They must receive them in order to have them, since they only potentially have them by nature of being material beings. The power to give the forms is in God as regards their origin; beings composed of matter and form only exist and have the power to act because God provides their form and existence.

Of final importance is this: God’s creation isn’t in the past or any temporal moment, but right now. The act of determining matter with forms doesn’t take place in space and time because, for space and time to exist, these beings must exist. Suppose that one has a box. But if you destroy that box, the space within it ceases to exist because the being that allows its existence ceases to exist. The same is true for a house, a planet and the universe. Yet material objects don’t exist until matter is given form. Creation is thus beyond space and time and its temporal moments. The need for activation and formalization of the natural world never ends; the need doesn’t end when the forms are infused. For these beings that are activated or formalized remain intrinsically potential in their existence. The forms must continually be given to animate matter as objects interact in space and time. God and His creative act are never left behind as space-time continues, because space and time require His creation. God sustains all beings from the eternity that is His very Being.

Source: Smith, Wolfgang. The Quantum Enigma: Finding the Hidden Key. 3rd ed. N.p.: Sophia Perennis, 2005. Print.

[1] The Uncertainty Principle, American Institute of Physics, http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08.htm